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IN DEFENCE OF THEOLOGICAL COMPATIBILISM 
Thomas P. Flint 
William Hasker has recently attacked the thesis that divine foreknowledge 
and human freedom are compatible. Hasker sees only two ways his opponents 
could respond to his argument: claim that we have causal power over God's 
past beliefs, or claim that we have counterfactual power over them. Hasker 
employs two principles in an attempt to show that the latter of these com-
patibilist responses collapses into the first, which he then criticizes. I argue 
that Hasker fails to discredit the second response, for his principles would 
be rejected by his adversaries, and his defence of the second principle is 
tantamount to begging the question. 
The argument for the incompatibility of human freedom and divine fore-
knowledge has recently been defended in a lucid and provocative manner by 
William Hasker.! As Hasker sees it, the most plausible means of defending 
what he calls compatibilism (the thesis that our freedom is not in conflict 
with God's prescience) requires that we have either counterfactual power 
over the past or causal power over the past. After arguing that the former 
type of power collapses into the latter type in the case of God's beliefs, 
Hasker contends that one can hold that we have causal power over the past 
only if one is willing to surrender the libertarian notion of freedom. Since 
few of those who embrace compatibilism re divine foreknowledge would be 
eager to enter into a permanent relationship with compatibilism re freedom, 
it follows that few philosophers should find the former type of compatibilism 
appealing. 
Despite the genuine virtues exhibited by his paper, it seems to me that 
Hasker's argument comes very close to exhibiting that tempting and perfid-
ious (albeit difficult to define) philosophical vice of begging the question. 
As one might expect with a philosopher of Hasker's caliber, the problem does 
not lie at the surface. Nevertheless, it seems clear to me that a bit of excava-
tion will suffice to reveal his argument's shaky foundations. 
Before digging into its deficiencies, let us first consider the argument in 
the form in which Hasker presents it. Mercifully granting Jones and his 
lawnmower a sabbatical, Hasker presents the argument via the example of 
"Clarence, an afficionado [sic] of cheese omelets, and ... the question, will 
Clarence have such an omelet for breakfast tomorrow morning, or won't he?" 
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If we assume the answer to be affirmative, Hasker suggests, we can construct 
the following, easily generalizable, argument for incompatibilism: 
(B1) It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast 
tomorrow. (premise) 
(B2) It is impossible that God should at any time believe what is false, or 
fail to believe anything which is true. (Premise: divine omniscience) 
(B3) Therefore, God has always believed that Clarence will have a cheese 
omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 1,2) 
(B4) If God has always believed a certain thing, it is not in anyone's power 
to bring it about that God has not always believed that thing. (Premise: 
the unalterability of the past) 
(B5) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to bring it about that God has 
not always believed that he would have a cheese omelet for breakfast. 
(From 3, 4) 
(B6) It is not possible for it to be true both that God has always believed that 
Clarence would have a cheese omelet for breakfast, and that he does 
not in fact have one. (From 2) 
(B7) Therefore, it is not in Clarence's power to refrain from having a cheese 
omelet for breakfast tomorrow. (From 5, 6) So Clarence's eating the 
omelet tomorrow is not an act of free choice. 
As Hasker sees it, there are two compatibilist ways of responding to this 
argument which need to be taken seriously. On the one hand, one might 
(following George Mavrodes) simply reject (B4).2 That is, one might contend 
that a person can indeed have causal power over the past. Hence, even if (B3) 
is true, Clarence might well still even now have the power to cause it to be 
the case that God didn't believe that Clarence would have a cheese omelet 
for breakfast tomorrow. On the other hand, one might (following Alvin 
Plantinga) accept (B4), but reject the inference from (BS) and (B6) to (B7).3 
According to Hasker, those who take this second option see us as having, not 
causal power over the past, but only what he calls counterfactual power over 
the past. Clarence, for example, does not have the power to cause it to be the 
case that God didn't believe he would make the omelet; but he does have the 
power to do something (namely, refrain from making the omelet) such that, 
if he were to do it, then God would never have believed that Clarence would 
make an omelet for breakfast tomorrow. 
Hasker's strategy in meeting these responses is one of unite and conquer. 
He first attempts to show that, at least in the case of God's past beliefs, the 
distinction between causal and counterfactual power over the past collapses; 
hence, the Plantingean position is tenable only if the Mavrodean position is 
defensible. He then attempts to undermine the Mavrodean stance by arguing 
that the notion of freedom which it employs is not a true libertarian notion. 
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Of course, an examination of the second half of this strategy is necessary 
only if one concludes that the first half-Le., the purported fusion of 
Plantinga and Mavrodes-has in fact been accomplished. Now, to show that 
Plantinga's position dissolves into Mavrodes', one needs to show that (B7) 
does indeed follow from (B5) and (B6). Suppose we employ the following 
abbreviations: 
P = Clarence has the power to bring it about [Le., to cause it to be the case] 
that 
a = Clarence will not have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow 
b = God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet for 
breakfast tomorrow 
We could then represent (B5) through (B7) as: 
(BS) -P-b 
(B6)- 0 (a & b) 
(B7)- Pa 
Hasker's task, then, is to show that [(B5) & (B6)] implies (B7); that is, that 
(X) [-P-b & - <> (a & b)] ::> -Pa4 
Hasker attempts to support (X) by appealing to two power entailment prin-
ciples which he borrows from Thomas Talbott.s The first of these reads as 
follows: 
(PEP3) If (a) it is within S's power to bring it about that P is true and (b) it 
is within S's power to bring it about that P is false and (c) P entails 
Q and not-P entails not-Q, then it is within S's power to bring it about 
that Q is true. 
Now, though it is not immediately evident how (PEP3) is supposed to justify 
(X), it seems clear that something like Hasker's argument would succeed 
were this principle to be accepted. Let" P" stand for "Clarence refrains from 
having a cheese omelet tomorrow", "Q" for "God has always believed that 
Clarence would refrain from having a cheese omelet tomorrow" and "S" for 
Clarence. Interpreted in this way, all three parts of the antecedent of (PEP3) 
will be affirmed by Plantingeans, hut its consequent will surely be denied, 
for that consequent asserts that Clarence has causal power over God's past 
beliefs, and as we have seen, the Plantingean wishes to grant Clarence only 
counterfactual power. If (PEP3) is true, then, the Plantingean position is 
surely in trouble. 
But why think that (PEP3) is true? Hasker says little in its defence. Rather 
than argue for it, he merely quotes (approvingly) Talbott's defence of it. 
(PEP3), says Talbott, "seems not only true but obviously true. Where P and 
Q are logically equivalent, it could hardly be up to me whether or not P is 
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true unless it were also up to me whether or not 0 is true."6 Though what 
Talbott says here is surely plausible, it actually falls far short of warranting 
the acceptance of (PEP3). For once we recognize that the notion of power 
can be given (at a minimum) the two interpretations relevant to a discussion 
of the Plantingean position-causal power as opposed to counterfactual 
power-it becomes apparent that the truth expressed by Talbott by no means 
entails (PEP3). If two propositions are logically equivalent and I have power 
over the truth of one of them (i.e., its truth is up to me), then it does seem 
clear that the truth of the other one is within my power as well; what does 
not seem clear is that I need to have power in the same sense of "power" over 
the second as over the first. Suppose I have causal power over the truth of 
one of two logically equivalent propositions; is it not sufficient that I have 
counterfactual power over the other? Is that not enough for me to say that 
each of them is such that its truth is up to me?? Hasker gives us no reason to 
think not. Hence, his defense of his argument via (PEP3) fails. 
As noted, though, Hasker believes that another principle formulated by 
Talbott can also be used to support the derivation of (B7). This principle is: 
(PEP4) If (a) it is within 5's power to bring it about that P is true, (b) P 
entails Q, and (c) Q is not a necessary condition of 5's having the 
power to bring it about that P is true, then it is within 5's power to 
bring it about that Q is true. 
As with (PEP3), the connection between (PEP4) and (X) is not particularly 
pellucid. Still, the usefulness of (PEP4) for Hasker's purposes is clear, as the 
reader may ascertain by again letting "s" stand for Clarence, "P" for "Clar-
ence refrains from having a cheese omelet tomorrow" and "0" for "God has 
always believed that Clarence would refrain from having a cheese omelet 
tomorrow." If (PEP4) is true, the Plantingean position is rendered untenable. 
But why think that (PEP4) is true? Hasker quotes the following "proof' by 
Talbott, a "proof' which he deems "both elegant and conclusive"s: 
If P entails Q, then it's within the power of a person S to bring it about that 
P is true only if at least one of these conditions is met: either Q is true or, if 
not true, then it's within S's power to bring it about that Q is true. Suppose, 
then, that P entails Q and it's not within S's power to bring it about that Q 
is true. It immediately follows that, unless Q is true, it's not within S's power 
to bring it about that P is true either; it follows, in other words, that Q is a 
necessary condition of S's having the power to bring it about that P is true.9 
Now, let's consider this argument for (PEP4). In particular, let's focus on the 
first sentence of the quotation from Talbott, a sentence which presents a long 
and somewhat daunting premise. Suppose we again let" P" abbreviate "Clar-
ence has the power to bring it about that" and change Talbott's upper case P 
and 0 into lower case p and q. Talbott's premise (applied to Clarence) could 
then be seen to have the form: 
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If p entails q, then Pp only if either q or Pq. 
But this is obviously equivalent to 
If p entails q and Pp, then either q or Pq, 
which in turn is equivalent to 
If p entails q and Pp and - q, then Pq. 
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Using the double-line arrow (-) to represent entailment (i.e., strict implica-
tion), we can thus present Talbott's premise as 
(Z) (p=q & Pp & - q) ::> Pq. 
Now, for (Z) to playa role in supporting (PEP4), and thereby in the defense 
of Hasker's argument for incompatibilism, it would have to be the kind of 
premise which one would expect any reasonable Plantingean to accept. On 
the face of it, though, (Z) simply does not appear to be such a premise; indeed, 
given their views on our inability to bring about God's past beliefs, 
Plantingeans would almost surely see nothing at all in (Z)'s favor. So it's 
hard to see how the trotting forth of (Z) suffices to show that the entailment 
of (B7) by (BS) and (B6) is something of which, as Hasker injudiciously puts 
it, "there can be no reasonable doubt."'O 
But the problem with (Z) runs deeper than its controversial nature within 
this dialectical context. Suppose we transpose the first two conjuncts of its 
antecedent; we would then have as an equivalent principle 
(ZI) (Pp & p=-p & - q) ::> -Pq, 
which in turn would obviously yield the equivalent 
(Z2) (- Pq & p=q & - q) ::> - Pp. 
Given the definition of entailment, (Z2) is itself equivalent to 
(Z3) [- Pq & - 0 (p & q) & - q] ::> Pp 
Now, anyone of these equivalent (Z)s is supposed to be a general principle 
applicable to any pair of propositions. So suppose we apply (Z3) to the case 
of Clarence and the omelet. Replacing p with our original a (Clarence will 
not have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow) and q with - b (It's not the 
case that God has always believed that Clarence would have a cheese omelet 
for breakfast tomorrow), we can derive 
(Y) [-P-b & - 0 (a & b) & b] ::> -Pa 
as an instantiation of (Z3). But once we see that (Z3) is nothing more than a 
universal generalization of (Y), it becomes apparent that Hasker's second 
argument for (X) is at least in the neighborhood of begging the question. For 
(Y) is virtually equivalent to (X). The only difference between the two is that 
(Y) has b as a third conjunct in its antecedent. But this difference is less than 
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negligible, since it is a common assumption of all compatibilists that, as 
premise (B3) states, b is true. Thus, the Plantingean who questions the truth 
of (X) will have equal doubts concerning (Y). Since Talbott's premise (Z) is 
equivalent to (Z3), and since (Z3) is nothing more than the universal general-
ization of (Y), it seems clear that no intelligent Plantingean should be ex-
pected to be swayed toward (X) by an argument which takes (Z) as one of 
its premises. And insofar as the only argument for (PEP4) which Hasker 
offers does employ (Z) as its sole premise, it follows that Hasker has provided 
the Plantingean no reason whatsoever to think that (PEP4) is true. 
Since neither of his attempts to fuse the compatibilist positions of Plantinga 
and Mavrodes succeeds, the criticisms Hasker offers of the latter's position 
are irrelevant to an evaluation of the Plantingean stance. Hence, Hasker fails 
to show that the libertarian should view God's foreknowledge as incompatible 
with our freedom.ll 
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